Mount Everest Case free essay sample

The formation of groups by the leaders lacked the consideration of the non-expert members’ skills. The leaders, groups and their members had different sets of goals in their minds. The teams’ goals did not fit well with the overall goals of the organization. There was an imbalance between the perceptions of the team members, guides and the leaders. (2) Right from the very beginning team leaders underestimated the challenges offered by Mount Everest. It indicates the tendency of overconfidence bias and recency effect of reliance on good weather in recent years. 3) The team members could not establish strong working relationships. Many team members were either not sure of their role in their teams or were reluctant to raise a point due to their perception that they were placed lower in the chain of command. Sherpas’ expertise was not properly utilized. In fact, the groups never moved beyond the forming phase. There was lack of group decision making. We will write a custom essay sample on Mount Everest Case or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page They had an excellent knowledge pool which the groups did not utilize to make decisions. (4) The leadership style of Hall Fischer discouraged feedback from the team members. Therefore, the leaders were distanced from guides and other team members. It was a detriment to working of the group as one unit. There was lack of participative management. However, participative management could not be used as a universal rule while facing hostile nature. This problem was compounded by an autocratic leadership style. Team members’ psychological safety was missing. (5) The leaders, guides and non-expert members all ignored the â€Å"two o’ clock rule†. This rule was set up by the leaders but they themselves did not adhere to it. Their late arrival at the summit left them with no choice but to descend in darkness and deal with hostile weather. There was no discussion about the relevance and usefulness of pushing forward with the climb knowing that the above rule would be violated. This is an indication of poor decision-making. (6) There was a lack of communication during different phases of this expedition. In the absence of live communication the members could not have reviewed and revised their goals and strategies if they felt that the weather or other circumstances were going against them. There were not enough radios. There were concerns about lack of sufficient supply of oxygen. The communication was flowing only from the top and in some case there was a complete communication breakdown. (7) The leaders, guides, and other members were reluctant to accept defeat. Some of these individuals had failed to climb Mount Everest in the past and they did not want to fail again. In essence, the groups lacked a thorough strategy for of digging in or moving back if risks became too obvious. It indicates escalation of commitment on the part of members. 8) Both Hall Fischer were leaders and visionaries of the groups’ strategy. However, during the expedition they became too occupied with the small operations and missed the possible opportunity to rethink and revise their overall plans and/or strategy. They could not adjust the perceptions of the team members and even allowed them to develop personal bias about the abilities of some of the members. (9) Physical and psycholog ical condition of some members deteriorated but they continued to climb. The leaders not only disregarded these members’ capabilities but also dedicated time to help them. This time could be spent on making critically important decisions (e. g. a possible decision to delay or abandon the last phase knowing that climbers would have to descend at night). Leaders focused on their individual goals and were overtaken by sunk cost effect. (1) Individual, group and organizational capabilities should be mixed in a way that they can achieve organizational goals. Subgroups should be created within the groups so that a buddy system can evolve. There should be no tiered membership of a group with the exception of the top leader. All members and Sherpas should work together and help each other in time of need without waiting for decisions originating from the top. Team members should be selected on the basis of their physical and psychological abilities. They should be provided training to learn deficient skills as well as importance of working as a cohesive group. Teams should be trained to work as self-managed team after they reach Camp III. Team members should be told that they can be dropped from the expedition any time if there is any doubt about their ability to reach the summit. 2) Leaders must adjust to the fact that despite the best preparation, Mount Everest holds surprises for all climbers. Human errors may indeed be a cause of failure but nature can force climbers to retreat and they should respect it. The perceptions of the team members should be shaped by the leaders in such a way that recognition of real challenges remains a serious factor on which the outcomes are based. If teams set up realistic goals and are willing to adjust their strategies according to the changing environment, they are more likely to succeed. (3) Groups should be ncouraged to communicate freely under preset rules. The leaders should interfere only when the norms are not being followed or they feel that they have to override group decisions in unusual circumstances. Upward, downward, horizontal and diagonal communication would facilita te problem solving and decision making at all levels. Effective communication also opens the door for adjustment of strategies to accommodate retreat, regroup and retry. (4) There cannot be any exception to the â€Å"two o’clock rule†. This rule is set up considering the hostile surroundings at the Mount Everest. If there is a delay in starting the move towards the summit, it only makes sense to abandon the plans for that day. These common sense rules must be followed by all leaders, guides, members and Sherpas without any exception. This rule must be followed by every individual just as a business is supposed to follow the law of the land. (5) To overcome sunk cost effect, overconfidence bias and recency effect, future expeditions should consider taking an independent expert with them whom they can rely on for making risk assessment and for unbiased guidance during the difficult circumstances as discussed in (4) above. 6) There is no scope for logistic problems for Mount Everest climbers. Procurement and management of supplies should be left with an outside firm. All supplies should reach the Base Camp before the teams. Perhaps, use of satellite weather images can guide the climbers to decide the timing of their push towards the summit. (7) Leaders should be available for guidance and also f or making critical decisions. They should refrain from executing the strategy. Instead of ensuring personal customer service to a client their role should be to stay committed to overall goals. If a team member falls ill, it is better to let a Sherpa escort the client to the camp. (8) If one has to rely on the complex systems theory, then the strategy should focus on eliminating human errors and group interaction difficulties and leave harsh weather to be dealt with on an â€Å"as needed† basis and pulling back when necessary. Cultural and Status Summary: American: Hansen, Dr. Weathers, Fischbeck, Kasischke, Taske and Krakauer (Adventure Consultants): Fischer (Leader-Experienced) , Beidleman (Guide – Experienced), Pitman, Fox, Madsen, Schoening, Schoening Jr. Martin Adams, Kruse (Mountain Madness): New Zealand: Hall (Leader-Experienced) and Harris – (Guide – Experienced) (Adventure Consultants) Australia: Groom – (Guide –Experienced) (Adventure Consultants): Japan: Namba (Adventure Consultants): Canada: Hutchison: Scandinavia: Gammelgaard: Russia/Kazakhstan: Boukreev – Guide Experienced Neal Beidleman Nepal: Lead and climbin g Sherpas (1) Beidleman (American) was a guide in the team led by Fischer (American). The other guide in their team was Boukreev (Russian). American culture is characterized as open and willing to discuss any subject. Beidleman considered himself as the â€Å"third† guide due to lack of solid high-altitude experience (or he felt that he was inferior to a Russian guide? ). He was not willing to express his views/concerns. It will be speculative to assume that Beidleman would have changed the outcome of 1996 expedition if he was able to express his views freely. The fact of the matter is that Beidleman and three others found their way to Camp IV on May 10. However, his perception did cause breakdown of free communication between the team members. (2) Nepalese people are known to be religious and modest. They have a passion for climbing mountains. The case authors have incorrectly characterized Sherpas’ interest in climbing due to money or status only. They live in the area and are used to the weather. They have tremendous amount of respect for the nature. They view Mount Everest as the â€Å"goddess of sky†. On the other hand, the Westerners have no such respect for the Mount Everest. Both Fischer and Hall were overconfident and showed no respect for Sherpas’ beliefs. This stark difference in the two cultures was perhaps a reason for violation of the â€Å"two o’ clock rule†. Lead and other Sherpas were considered servants and their expertise was totally ignored. Fischer’s decisions to take Schoening on a second attempt and later help Kruse took some valuable time and energy away from him. He could have delegated these tasks to a Sherpa. (3) Boukreev (Russian) did not know English well. He had difficulty building relationship with other team members. The other guide in Fischer’s team, Beidleman, had already developed a different perception about his place in the team. Boukreev’s limited language skills and Beidleman’s perception about his status hampered functioning of their team (group). It is not known whether Yasuko Namba (Japan) was fluent in English or there were other language/status/cultural barriers in Hall’s team. (4) Boukreev reached Camp IV at 5 pm on May 10 before others. Questions were raised about his early arrival to the Camp IV while others were struggling to reach the camp amid bad weather conditions. It is not clear if Boukreev felt a rush to save his life knowing or he just wanted to abandon the group due to his failure to build relationships. However, his explanation is logical that he wanted to be able to save lives later on when others needed help. Mount Everest Case free essay sample The formation of groups by the leaders lacked the consideration of the non-expert members’ skills. The leaders, groups and their members had different sets of goals in their minds. The teams’ goals did not fit well with the overall goals of the organization. There was an imbalance between the perceptions of the team members, guides and the leaders. (2) Right from the very beginning team leaders underestimated the challenges offered by Mount Everest. It indicates the tendency of overconfidence bias and recency effect of reliance on good weather in recent years. 3) The team members could not establish strong working relationships. Many team members were either not sure of their role in their teams or were reluctant to raise a point due to their perception that they were placed lower in the chain of command. Sherpas’ expertise was not properly utilized. In fact, the groups never moved beyond the forming phase. There was lack of group decision making. We will write a custom essay sample on Mount Everest Case or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page They had an excellent knowledge pool which the groups did not utilize to make decisions. (4) The leadership style of Hall Fischer discouraged feedback from the team members. Therefore, the leaders were distanced from guides and other team members. It was a detriment to working of the group as one unit. There was lack of participative management. However, participative management could not be used as a universal rule while facing hostile nature. This problem was compounded by an autocratic leadership style. Team members’ psychological safety was missing. (5) The leaders, guides and non-expert members all ignored the â€Å"two o’ clock rule†. This rule was set up by the leaders but they themselves did not adhere to it. Their late arrival at the summit left them with no choice but to descend in darkness and deal with hostile weather. There was no discussion about the relevance and usefulness of pushing forward with the climb knowing that the above rule would be violated. This is an indication of poor decision-making. (6) There was a lack of communication during different phases of this expedition. In the absence of live communication the members could not have reviewed and revised their goals and strategies if they felt that the weather or other circumstances were going against them. There were not enough radios. There were concerns about lack of sufficient supply of oxygen. The communication was flowing only from the top and in some case there was a complete communication breakdown. (7) The leaders, guides, and other members were reluctant to accept defeat. Some of these individuals had failed to climb Mount Everest in the past and they did not want to fail again. In essence, the groups lacked a thorough strategy for of digging in or moving back if risks became too obvious. It indicates escalation of commitment on the part of members. 8) Both Hall Fischer were leaders and visionaries of the groups’ strategy. However, during the expedition they became too occupied with the small operations and missed the possible opportunity to rethink and revise their overall plans and/or strategy. They could not adjust the perceptions of the team members and even allowed them to develop personal bias about the abilities of some of the members. (9) Physical and psycholog ical condition of some members deteriorated but they continued to climb. The leaders not only disregarded these members’ capabilities but also dedicated time to help them. This time could be spent on making critically important decisions (e. g. a possible decision to delay or abandon the last phase knowing that climbers would have to descend at night). Leaders focused on their individual goals and were overtaken by sunk cost effect. (1) Individual, group and organizational capabilities should be mixed in a way that they can achieve organizational goals. Subgroups should be created within the groups so that a buddy system can evolve. There should be no tiered membership of a group with the exception of the top leader. All members and Sherpas should work together and help each other in time of need without waiting for decisions originating from the top. Team members should be selected on the basis of their physical and psychological abilities. They should be provided training to learn deficient skills as well as importance of working as a cohesive group. Teams should be trained to work as self-managed team after they reach Camp III. Team members should be told that they can be dropped from the expedition any time if there is any doubt about their ability to reach the summit. 2) Leaders must adjust to the fact that despite the best preparation, Mount Everest holds surprises for all climbers. Human errors may indeed be a cause of failure but nature can force climbers to retreat and they should respect it. The perceptions of the team members should be shaped by the leaders in such a way that recognition of real challenges remains a serious factor on which the outcomes are based. If teams set up realis tic goals and are willing to adjust their strategies according to the changing environment, they are more likely to succeed. (3) Groups should be ncouraged to communicate freely under preset rules. The leaders should interfere only when the norms are not being followed or they feel that they have to override group decisions in unusual circumstances. Upward, downward, horizontal and diagonal communication would facilitate problem solving and decision making at all levels. Effective communication also opens the door for adjustment of strategies to accommodate retreat, regroup and retry. (4) There cannot be any exception to the â€Å"two o’clock rule†. This rule is set up considering the hostile surroundings at the Mount Everest. If there is a delay in starting the move towards the summit, it only makes sense to abandon the plans for that day. These common sense rules must be followed by all leaders, guides, members and Sherpas without any exception. This rule must be followed by every individual just as a business is supposed to follow the law of the land. (5) To overcome sunk cost effect, overconfidence bias and recency effect, future expeditions should consider taking an independent expert with them whom they can rely on for making risk assessment and for unbiased guidance during the difficult circumstances as discussed in (4) above. 6) There is no scope for logistic problems for Mount Everest climbers. Procurement and management of supplies should be left with an outside firm. All supplies should reach the Base Camp before the teams. Perhaps, use of satellite weather images can guide the climbers to decide the timing of their push towards the summit. (7) Leaders should be available for guidance and also for making critical decisions. They should refrain from executing the strategy. Instead of ensuring personal customer service to a client their role should be to stay committed to overall goals. If a team member falls ill, it is better to let a Sherpa escort the client to the camp. (8) If one has to rely on the complex systems theory, then the strategy should focus on eliminating human errors and group interaction difficulties and leave harsh weather to be dealt with on an â€Å"as needed† basis and pulling back when necessary.